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Summary
European aid is a business whose future is hotly debated. ’Maximalists’ would like to
see growth in community action at the expense of national action, with deepening and
possible geographical widening of Lomé relationships, accompanied by greater
political accountability. 'Minimalists' would abandon the idea of contractuality and
partnership with Lomé countries, and renationalise aid wherever possible. In
adjudicating between these competing visions, issues of aid quality are central, taking
quality to mean not just the long term development impact of aid, but also its
effectiveness in meeting short term objectives, and its implementation efficiency. An
evaluation of EU aid to Ethiopia, valued at close to $US 2.5 billion dollars over
eighteen years, throws light on the issue of aid quality. Some aid, perhaps most,
'worked'; but some did not - for reasons partly internal to Ethiopia and partly internal
to the EU. The EU programme has improved markedly but could improve further: a
seven point action programme is proposed to enable the EU to achieve an objective-
driven strategy. A shift of resources from national action to community action would
then be justified, capitalising on the economies of scale and the scope for more
effective policy dialogue. A European Development Agency would also become an
attractive idea.
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11. Introduction2
The European Union is never short on controversy; and in the sphere of development
aid, a business now worth $US 5 billion a year to the EU3, there is certainly much to
discuss at present. In 1995, the mid-term review of Lomé IV was completed and an
acrimonious dispute was settled about the level of funding available to the year 2000:
in neither case was the outcome particularly favourable to developing countries4. In
1996, attention has turned to the future of development aid after that time, when Lomé
IV expires. Here, a Green Paper has been published by the Commission (EC 1996)
and there is a many-layered debate. The debate ranges from the high politics of first
world-third world relations within the grand European project, itself the subject of the
on-going Inter-Governmental Conference, to internal issues like how to allocate
development portfolios within the Directorates General of the European Commission.
As the debate evolves, in think tanks, conferences and position papers5, it is possible
to discern two alternative visions of the future of European development aid, no doubt
with gradations in between. As visions go, these maximalist and minimalist versions
of the future do not come entirely out of the blue6. They do, however, have brand new
features, reflecting contemporary events like the debate on subsidiarity, the Final Act
of GATT, the apparent tilt of EU priorities towards the Mediterranean, or the
prospective enlargement of the EU to embrace countries in Eastern Europe. Figure 1
provides a schematic outline of the two competing visions, and in so doing helps to
map the current debate about the future of European development aid.
At one extreme, the maximalist position aspires to the continuation of a contractual
aid and trade partnership with the 70 countries of the ACP group, running in parallel
and perhaps linked to programmes for other regional groupings, like Asia and the
Mediterranean. The vision is of an aid programme enlarged and strengthened, so that
aid channelled through the European Commission, so-called 'community action',
comes to assume a larger share of  total aid from European countries to the developing
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2Figure 1
Maximalist and Minimalist positions for the evolution of European aid
Maximalist position Minimalist position
Geographical
coverage
Priority to 70 ACP countries,
parallel to programmes for other
regional blocs
All developing countries
indiscriminately
Substantive
coverage
Aid and trade Aid only
Contractuality
and partnership
Yes - renew Lomé No - abandon Lomé
Finance Maintain non-budgetary
European Development Fund
Budgetise all aid
Size of
programme
Increasing - maximise
Commission 'acquis'
Decreasing - 'renationalise'
wherever possible
Scope of
programme
Broad - cover all aid
instruments, engage in policy
dialogue with recipient
countries
Narrow - specialise in sector and
project aid, leave policy dialogue
to Bretton Woods Institutions and
humanitarian aid to the UN
Political
accountability
More control by European
Parliament
Maintain control by Member
States through Development
Council
Administration Create European Development
Agency
Simplify and streamline existing
bureaucracy
world: bilateral aid, or 'national action' might, on this vision, eventually wither away.
Growth would be accompanied by the development of greater policy expertise, so that
the Commission would finally emerge as a heavyweight player in policy dialogue,
acting as a counter-balance to the 'Washington consensus' of the Bretton Woods
Institutions. It would require administrative reorganisation, and greater political
accountability through the European parliament. In principle, this is certainly an
attractive vision.
The minimalist position, by contrast, seeks to fetter the growth of EU aid and to
'renationalise' wherever possible, so that member state programmes predominate. It
sees little value in preserving the contractual nature of the Lomé agreement, especially
since trade preferences have been eroded by GATT; and it points to the inconsistency
that many poor countries, especially those in South Asia, are not members of the ACP.
On this reading, the minimalists would prefer a unified aid budget, covering all
traditional countries, and run along traditional lines by a smaller and less dispersed aid
3administration in Brussels. They would maintain political control of the programme
through the Development Council and its network of committees, rather than through
the Parliament.
Adjudicating between these competing visions of the future - or negotiating a
compromise between them - is partly a matter of political preference. However, policy
analysis can also play a part, by illuminating the costs and benefits of different routes.
Here, the key issue is quality. Is European aid in some sense ’better’ than, or equivalent
to, bilateral aid provided by member states - or, indeed, through the World Bank and
the UN? If the answer to this question is positive, then there may be unequivocal
benefits in moving towards the maximalist position. If, on the other hand, the answer
is negative, then movement will be determined by whether the cost represented by
lower quality is justified by political or other benefits.
Now, the question about aid quality is difficult to answer. It is difficult enough to
establish whether or not aid has positive effects on growth, poverty reduction and
social welfare, even in the aggregate, for all countries and all donors (White 1992,
Mosley and Hudson 1995). It is much more difficult to do so for individual donors
and individual countries (White 1995, Mosley and Hudson ibid.). The problem is
made more complex when what is asked for is a comparison between one form of aid
(community action) and another (national action). Despite the breadth and historical
depth of the literature on aid, this is a question that is only beginning to be asked7.
In principle, there should of course be great advantages in European aid, as a slightly
special form of multilateral aid. Comparing community action with national action
(though not with UN or other ’pure’ multilateral aid) there should be economies of
scale, greater cost-effectiveness in procurement, clearer lines of political
accountability, and simplification of administration. The EU also has a role, enshrined
in the Maastricht Treaty, in the co-ordination of all aid from member states.
The study which this paper summarises does not provide answers to the comparative
questions. However, as the first full-scale evaluation of European aid to a single
country, it does shed light on the question ’Does European Aid Work?’; and in so
doing, begin to shed light on the political debate between maximalists and
minimalists.
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meant by the idea of aid ’working’ or ’not working’. Section 3 summarises the findings
of the Ethiopia study. And Section 4 explores the implications for the debate on
European aid. In brief, the paper concludes that  some aid, perhaps most, ’worked’, but
some did not - for reasons partly internal to Ethiopia and partly internal to the EU. The
EU programme has improved markedly but could improve further: a seven point
action programme is proposed to enable the EU to achieve an objective-driven
strategy. A shift of resources from national action to community action would then be
justified, capitalising on the economies of scale and the scope for more effective
policy dialogue. A European Development Agency would also become an attractive
idea.
2. Measuring aid performance
Writing originally in 1985, Cassen and associates (1994:6) defined aid effectiveness
in development terms, deliberately excluding political and commercial considerations:
’Does aid contribute macro-economically or otherwise to growth? Does
it reach the poor? .... Does aid help or hinder an appropriate
functioning of market forces?’
These questions have received much attention in the research-based academic
literature (White ibid., Mosley and Hudson ibid.). The results are mixed.
Acknowledging the difficulties of evaluation, Cassen and associates (ibid:7) reached
’at least a well-educated assessment’ that ’most aid works’.   Similarly, Mosley and
Hudson (ibid:11), quoting World bank data, describe the ’positive direct effect of
projects, as evidenced by the overwhelming positive rates of return reported at ex-post
evaluation’. At the aggregate level, however, the indicators are less encouraging:
summarising a variety of studies, Mosley and Hudson (ibid:11) conclude that ’the
average impact of overseas aid (is) low or even neutral’. In the case of British aid to a
sample of countries, ’significant influence on .... under 5 mortality is achieved more
frequently than significant influence on growth’ (ibid:6).
In the evaluation literature, mostly sponsored by aid agencies, aid performance has
been approached more on a project by project basis, though sometimes at the sector
level or by instrument (for example, food aid). At the same time, there has been less
attention to overall impact in terms of the criteria set out by Cassen, and more to other
aspects of performance. The inspiration here has been the logical framework, which
5sets out a structure for the relationship between inputs and overall development
objectives, and also defines different levels of evaluation. These are reproduced in
Figure 2, which distinguishes between efficiency, effectiveness and impact evaluation.
The first is concerned with the outputs of a project (e.g. ’extension services provided’),
the second with short term objectives or purposes (e.g. ’increase crop yields or
agricultural output’) and only the third with poverty reduction or growth (e.g. ’increase
income or reduce poverty’). Thus, the term ’effectiveness’, as used by Cassen, is here
redefined as impact.
Figure 2
An Evaluation Model for Analysing Development Assistance Projects
Inputs Outputs Purpose Goal
Goal hierarchy
Efficiency:
achievement
of results
Effectiveness:
achievement of objectives
Impact:
other effects of the project
the direction and usefulness
the long-term viability of the project
of the project
Relevance:
Sustainability:
Evaluation
components
Source: Norway, 1993: 23
6In practice, many evaluation studies do not consider impact, regarding the long term
outcomes of projects as being somewhat remote from the inputs provided by aid, and
subject to the influence of many external factors beyond the control of the project.
Thus, the EU, for example, tends to concentrate on relevance, efficiency and
effectiveness, defining them as in Box 1 below.
Three problems remain, even with the limits on evaluation set out in Box 1. First, ’aid’
consists of many heterogeneous activities, some of which are much more difficult to
evaluate than others. Standard evaluation methodology is derived from project-level
social cost benefit analysis, in which direct effects can be identified and measured.
This is not so easy in the case of programme aid (White and Toye (eds) forthcoming),
technical co-operation (Berg 1993, Fukuda-Parr 1995) or other forms of aid which
may have economy-wide benefits or substantial non-monetary benefits. Limiting
evaluation to effectiveness and not impact simplifies the problem but does not entirely
remove it.
Box 1
Relevance, effectiveness and efficiency
Relevance: assesses the problems to be solved and the project objectives against their
physical and policy ’environment’, i.e. the main features of the sector and pertinent
policies of the various actors.
Effectiveness: assesses the extent to which the project results have contributed
towards the achievement of the project purpose or whether this can be expected to
happen in the future on the basis of the current results of the project.
Efficiency: assesses whether the activities have been carried out efficiently in order to
yield the project results. Have the means of the project been efficiently transformed
through the project’s activities into the various project results? Could the same or
similar results have been achieved at lower cost?
Source: ’Evaluation Report Lay-out’, EU Commission, Feb. 1995
The second problem is that of comparators. Against what standard is aid performance
to be measured? Again, this is a relatively straightforward problem in cost-benefit
analysis, where standard minimum rates of return can be defined, but is more difficult
for non-project aid, and when it comes to defining effectiveness and efficiency. It is
necessary for any evaluation to define its benchmarks in advance.
7Finally, the task of evaluation is not just to measure performance, but also to explain
it. Explaining means addressing a new set of issues, which can be described as
’systemic’: these refer to the attributes of the donor or the recipient, and are the areas in
which recommendations need to be made.
3. European Aid to Ethiopia, 1976-94
(a) Introduction
As noted above, the Ethiopia evaluation was the first full-scale study of European aid
to a single country. Field work was carried out in March 1995, and a seven volume
report was published in June 1996 (IDS and IDR 1996). The task of the evaluation
was to assess the relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of  European aid. In addition,
it was concerned with the management of the programme as a whole, both by the EU
and by the Government of Ethiopia, and with the policies, procedures and
administration of the EU aid system.
The methodological problems were those outlined in the previous section, namely the
heterogeneity of the programme, the question of comparators and the need to identify
underlying systemic issues. The methods used to overcome these problems included
documentary analysis, key informant interviews, site visits, a limited amount of
participatory rural appraisal, and five focus group discussions. The team also made
use of the logical framework and of a specially designed evaluation scoring system
(IDS and IDR ibid.: 2ff).
In terms of comparators, the team made reference to DAC best practice guidelines
(OECD 1992) and to the EU’s own policy documents (IDS and IDR ibid:117ff). The
focus group discussions provided both a checklist of systemic issues and initial bench-
marking of the EU against other donors (Maxwell 1996b). The checklist is reproduced
in Figure 3 and provides a kind of best-practice charter for donors and recipients.
8Figure 3
Best practice criteria: a synthesis of focus group discussions
How to be a good donor How to be a good recipient How to be a good NGO
1. A clear development philosophy 1. Respect for human rights and
liberty of press
1. Clear objectives
2. A wide range of instruments 2. Internal peace and stability 2. Communication and co-
ordination with Government
3. A high grant element 3. A commitment to development 3. Capacity-building and use of
local structures
4. Low tying of aid 4. Clear long and medium term
strategies
4. Flexibility
5. A jointly negotiated aid
framework
5. A commitment to open and
constructive policy dialogue at
macro and sector levels
5. Community participation
6. A capacity for policy analysis 6. A good working relationship
with donors
6. Advocacy
7. Constructive policy dialogue 7. The technical and administrative
capacity to identify, prepare and
appraise projects for donor
financing
7. Attention to women’s issues
8. A long term commitment 8. Clear lines of authority for
decentralised planning and
project implementation
8. Accountability - to the people,
government and donors
9. A capacity for sector analysis
and planning
9. A commitment to beneficiary
participation
9. Transparency
10. Cooperation with other donors 10. A commitment to meeting
staffing and local cost
provisions for projects
10. Low overheads and good
administration
11. A commitment to genuine
recipient and stake-holder
participation in project selection
and design
11. The absence of corruption 11. Compliance with government
guidelines
12. Systematic and transparent
project appraisal and approval
procedures
12. Good administration and
accounting
12. Ability to link relief with
development by adopting an
integrated approach
13. Decentralised decision-making
and management
13. Timely monitoring and
reporting
13. Co-ordination between NGOs
14. High technical capacity in field
offices and headquarters
14. A commitment to self-criticism
and learning
14. Use of local resources and
structures
15. Continuity of project
management
15. Support to local NGOs
16. Flexibility on the ground in
project operations
16. Few expatriate staff and
employment opportunities for
nationals
17. Quick, simple, open procedures
for financing and procurement
17. Effective and efficient use of
resources
18. Effective monitoring and
evaluation, leading to change
18. Quality and timeliness of
reporting
19. A high level of accountability
Source: IDS and IDR 1996: Appendix VII
9(b) ’Hitting a moving target from a moving platform’
The EU committed over 2 billion ECU in 1990 prices in aid to Ethiopia between 1976
and 1994, equivalent to about $ US 2.5 billion. The programme included both
emergency relief and development aid. It drew on a wide variety of aid instruments
available from the EU. And it touched almost every sector of the Ethiopian economy.
Figure 4 illustrates the evolution of the programme over the period. It shows both
substantial growth and a changing distribution. At the beginning of the period, in the
Lomé I phase, most commitments fell under the National Indicative Programme, the
main vehicle for disbursement under the European Development Fund. By Lomé III,
the situation had changed as food aid (financed from the budget) became an important
feature of aid to Ethiopia, and as Stabex also grew in importance. In Lomé IV, food
aid remained substantial, Stabex grew even larger, and further diversification was
brought about by the introduction of a new window for Structural Adjustment
Support.
These changes illustrate the evolution of the EU aid programme over the period,
particularly the diversification of instruments in Lomés III and IV8. There were other
changes, too, particularly the increasing level of policy dialogue and policy
conditionality in Lomés III and IV. Whereas the Lomé I and II periods were
dominated by the idea of contractuality, in which the recipient countries took the lead
in defining aid programmes, Lomés III and IV saw the gradual erosion of this
principle, and its replacement with a more conventional approach. This tendency has
been further reinforced in the Mid Term Review of Lomé IV.
At the same time, Ethiopia itself underwent major changes during the evaluation
period. For most of that time, a socialist regime led by Mengistu Haile Mariam ruled
the country, though engaged in a constantly escalating civil war which finally led to
the overthrow of the regime in 1991 and the secession of Eritrea in 1993. The regime
followed Stalinist policies until the late 1980s, characterised by pervasive state control
of the economy, forced villagisation of the peasantry and compulsory resettlement
programmes. In 1988, there was a partial liberalisation, followed in 1990 by a
comprehensive move to a market economy. This process continued under the new
government.
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Figure 4
Aid Flow to Ethiopia, 1976-1993
Average Annual Commitments by Lomé Agreement (at constant 1990 ECU)
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Changes of this magnitude on both the donor and recipient sides muddy the waters of
evaluation. More importantly, they greatly complicated the planning and management
of the aid relationship. The National Indicative Programme for Lomé IV, for example,
due just at the time the Mengistu regime was overthrown, had effectively to be
negotiated three times - and continuing negotiations with the new Government meant
that four years into the Lomé period, at the end of 1994, only 20 per cent of the
resources earmarked had been committed. In any case, it is important not to judge the
programme by standards that were inappropriate at the time, and to take into account
the problem of 'hitting a moving target from a moving platform'.
(c) Sectoral perspectives
Figure 5 illustrates the sectoral distribution of EU aid expenditure over the evaluation
period. On the development side, infrastructure was the dominant sector in Lomés I
and II, agriculture took over in Lomé III, and programme aid (including Stabex) has
been dominant in Lomé IV. These sectoral priorities reflected changing thinking in
successive Lomé agreements. Food aid grew rapidly, as can be seen, and was mostly
destined for emergency purposes, although a proportion was used for development
projects, and, latterly, for sale to support the market and generate counterpart funds.
11
Figure 5
EU Aid Commitments to Ethiopia by Evaluation Sector, 1976-1993
(in constant 1990 ECU)
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Within these broad parameters, the EU supported a wide variety of activities: large
agricultural projects, like the Shoa Peasant Area Development Project (PADEP) and
the Coffee Improvement Programme; major infrastructure, like water supply for Addis
Ababa or the power line for Dessie; hospitals and roads, fertiliser imports and budget
support, NGO co-financing projects; and, of course, a very large volume of food aid.
The evaluation ’story’ told by this heterogeneous package is inevitably complex. The
activities cover different kinds of aid, trying to achieve different things, in different
places, and at different moments in the evolution of European aid policy and
Ethiopian political economy. Much good work was accomplished, and very many
lives were saved by emergency relief.
A number of themes run through the evaluation reports: the enormous difficulties of
’doing business’ in Mengistu’s Ethiopia; the negative impact of an unfavourable policy
environment; the challenges posed by repeated shocks, whether climatic, political or
economic; ’learning by doing’ and gradual improvement in the quality of the EU
programme; but nevertheless a mixed record of success and failure, with scope for
further improvement.
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In general, it was evident that some activities out-performed others. Thus, in
infrastructure, water and energy, the large engineering projects, like the Amarti
Diversion project or the Addis Ababa water supply project, were more successful than
the geographically scattered and socially complex projects, like rural water supply. In
the agriculture field, also, the technology-driven projects, like Amibara irrigation and
Central Shoa PADEP, seemed to out-perform projects in more difficult physical and
social environments, like soil conservation projects. In the programme aid sector, the
agricultural Sectoral Import Programme, another fairly straightforward project, scored
more highly than more complex alternatives, notably Stabex.
It was difficult to reach generalisations about comparative sectoral performance.
However, it was notable that the food aid and agriculture/rural development
evaluations were generally less favourable than those of the other sectors.
These findings, it has to be said, are not unfamiliar in the aid evaluation literature: a
mixed pattern of success and failure, the difficulty of managing socially-complex
poverty reduction projects, the dominant importance of the recipient country’s
domestic policy environment, all these are themes common to most analysis of aid
(see e.g. Cassen and associates ibid.). The interesting evaluation question is how far
the pattern of success and failure can be explained by the attributes of the donor
agency and by the quality of the aid relationship it enjoyed. It is in examining this
question that we come closer to the underlying quality questions about European aid.
(d) Thematic issues9
The analysis of thematic issues in the evaluation report is carried out under the
headings of ’relevance’, ’effectiveness’ and ’efficiency’. The following is a brief and
partial summary.
Relevance: Policy, Planning and Programming
In terms of overall relevance, the EU aid programme in Ethiopia certainly addressed
issues of fundamental importance to one of the poorest countries of the world. There
can be no criticism of the programme for concentrating on rural infrastructure and
rural development, for providing a large amount of food aid, especially during and
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after the great famine of 1984/85, or for supporting economic liberalisation and
structural adjustment through the Emergency Recovery and Reconstruction
Programme after 1991. The large infrastructure projects in energy and water supply
also appear to have met a genuine need.
The issues that arise are more subtle: first, the political question of providing aid to a
totalitarian regime in the 1970s and 1980s; secondly, questions about critical mass and
integration of instruments; and, thirdly, an issue about the capacity to engage in the
policy analysis and policy dialogue required to mount successful projects.
The political issue was not trivial for a country with a very poor human rights record
and the status of a pariah state among most other western donors. EU development aid
unfortunately provided some moral comfort to the regime and  may have supported
the war indirectly. Under Lomés I and II, the EU formally had no room for manoeuvre
and was bound by the contractuality provisions of the Convention10. Under Lomé III,
when conditions changed, the EU engaged in a major programme of policy dialogue.
It is ironic that the EU finally 'geared up' to handle difficult regimes, just at the time
when Ethiopia was moving rapidly in the EU's direction.
On critical mass and integration of instruments, by far the biggest problem was the
lack of linkage between food aid and other instruments, caused by different sources of
funding and different planning procedures. As a result, food and financial aid were
largely directed to different parts of the country and opportunities for
complementarity, including in policy dialogue, were missed. There were similar
problems with other budget lines (of which there are more than thirty altogether,
though not all applicable to Ethiopia).
The multiplicity of aid instruments and the complexity of the EU programme in
Ethiopia suggest that a single country programme is needed. Yet the planning cycle
for the five-yearly National Indicative Programmes has not met the need, because a
large part of aid has been outside the NIP. A more general country strategy has,
however, been prepared for the Lomé IV bis period, covering 1996-2000.
As country programmes are prepared, and as these are then turned into sectoral
programmes and finally into projects, a capacity to carry out policy dialogue is
essential. The EU was weak on policy dialogue until Lomé III, for reasons already
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discussed. It took important initiatives under Lomé III and made a positive
contribution, along with other donors and reformers within the Government. There
were other success stories later, for example the leadership role of the EU in
negotiating a new approach to the management of counterpart funds. Nevertheless,
performance on policy dialogue was uneven. The EU was repeatedly described to the
evaluation team as 'punching below its weight'.
Effectiveness and Sustainability
On effectiveness and sustainability, the main issue which arose was the unfavourable
policy environment during much of the period reviewed. However, there were also
some problems with project design, and with the lack of continuity of support to some
projects.
Many projects would have seemed much more successful in retrospect had the policy
environment been better. The policy of the Mengistu Government had some positive
features, including the land reform of 1975 and the commitment to literacy campaigns
in the late 1970s and early 1980s. However, the overall balance was negative: in terms
of market control and pricing, problems of state-sponsored institutions, and poor
policy, including forced villagisation and resettlement. The war also had an important
negative effect: apart from the loss of life and the cost, a great deal of infrastructure
was damaged or destroyed. Several EU-supported institutions were looted during the
final days of the Mengistu regime.
In terms of project design, there was a general problem with over-centralisation and
over-standardisation, reflecting a bias of the Ethiopian Government that the EU
should perhaps have done more to challenge. More generally, EU projects would have
benefited from the preparation of stronger appraisal reports, and from earlier adoption
of the logical framework as a planning tool. The standards of project cycle
management appeared to be higher for EDF-funded projects than for projects funded
by EU budget lines.
Support to particular projects was sometimes insufficient. The discontinuities between
Lomés may help to account for this. At the same time, field-level initiatives were
hampered by long chains of decision-making back to Brussels.
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Efficiency: Management, Supervision and Reporting
Questions of management, supervision and reporting featured prominently in key
informant interviews and focus group discussions. In the focus groups, for example,
speed of decision-making, efficiency of administration and project management were
all cited as areas where the EU compared unfavourably with other donors. In many
cases, routine project management was favourably evaluated, presumably as a result
of the joint effort of Ethiopian Government staff and EU contractors. However,
problems were cited on the Government side, and also, very forcefully, on the side of
the EU. The main problem areas were delegation of authority, staffing, procedures,
and reporting.
The issue of decentralisation is best exemplified by the lack of delegated authority to
approve projects at the country level, a situation which contrasts markedly with other
donors. It has costs in terms of the long delays in the system: up to a year to approve
an NGO project or a Framework of Mutual Obligations for Stabex, and long delays in
procurement. The problem is compounded by overly complex procedures. It seemed
that the word ’Delegation’ was a misnomer for EU field offices.
The problem of under-staffing was manifest in the lack of junior professional and
support staff to assist Delegation Advisers and the desk officer in Brussels. USAID,
for example, had 25 local professional staff in Addis Ababa (excluding administration
and public relations), the EU had none. This was particularly surprising, as one EU
international staff member cost at least twenty times as much as a similarly well-
qualified Ethiopian recruited locally.
Food aid provided an extreme case of lack of professional input at the field level. In
1994, there was one logistics specialist, with little policy role or local administrative
support, to monitor a programme costing over 30 per cent of total EU commitments to
Ethiopia. Partly as a result, the Delegate and other officials, with other
responsibilities, were drawn into the food aid programme. A new unit had, however,
just been established in the Delegation, adding two additional posts.
The staffing problem had a number of knock-on costs. One was the heavy reliance on
consultants, which has adverse consequences for continuity. For example, the Coffee
Improvement Project had been subject to at least six different reviews, each
undertaken by a different consultant organisation.
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Finally, on monitoring and evaluation, the sectoral reports identified a need for more
evaluation of project effects and impact, perhaps through the medium of regular end
of project completion reports. Statistical reporting had been a problem in the past, and
although matters seemed to be improving, standards for most of the period had been
unacceptable. The absence of a single, annual report on all aid from the EU to
developing countries was a major omission.
(e) Conclusions
Drawing the analysis together, the study of European aid to Ethiopia shows both
strengths and weaknesses. An overriding impression, however, confirmed in focus
group discussions, was of an aid programme that was bigger than the capacity to
manage it, a problem of not cutting the coat according to the cloth. As one
commentator put it, ’the EU’s eyes are bigger than its stomach’ (IDS and IDR 1996:
107).
There are seven main ways, however, in which the programme can be improved.
These are listed in Figure 6. Some of these are Ethiopia-specific, but mostly they refer
to the policy, planning, procedures, staffing and management of the European aid
system as a whole.  The report contains some 90 separate recommendations on these
matters.  Budget lines to be eliminated or amalgamated.  A policy manual to be
prepared.  A procedure for unified country strategies to be introduced.  Delegations to
have budgets under their own control for policy analysis and programme
development.  The ceiling for local approval of projects to be raised from the present
level of ECU 60,000.  A task force to be set up to review reporting procedures.  Local
professionals to be appointed to Delegations.  And so on.
In practical terms, the evaluation concluded that the EU faced a clear choice in
Ethiopia between two different strategies. One was to opt for an ’objective-driven
strategy’ and to tackle the problems listed in Figure 6. The other was to ’cut the coat
according to the cloth’. This would mean maximising the return to the scarce resource,
which in the opinion of the evaluation team was ’professional staff time to plan,
manage, monitor and evaluate an aid programme characterised by unusually great
diversity and complexity’ IDS and IDR ibid.: 111). The strategy would involve
maximising disbursement per unit of professional input, which would bias the
programme to large-scale resource transfers like programme aid and large
infrastructure projects, at the expense of impact on poverty, food security and other
EU objectives. Clearly, an objective-driven strategy was preferable.
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Figure 6
Improving the EU aid programme in Ethiopia: 7 key issues
1. Simplifying and focusing the range of aid instruments.
2. Strengthening strategic planning at the country level, esp. with respect to
integration of instruments.
3. Improving macro-economic and sectoral policy analysis and policy dialogue (with
Government and other partners).
4. Reinforcing the project cycle, leading to better project preparation and supervision.
5. Decentralising and simplifying aid administration.
6. Improving standards of reporting.
7. Better deployment of human resources, especially support for Professional staff.
4. Conclusion
We started with the question ’Does European Aid Work?’, and with the supposition
that there might be particular advantages in terms of economies of scale or political
conditionality that would justify an enlargement of EU aid at the expense of national
action. The Ethiopia study allows two sorts of answers to the over-arching question
about the effects of aid.
First, the study shows that some, perhaps most, European aid has ’worked’, in the
sense of achieving its short-term objectives; but, equally, that some has not. This
answer needs to be understood as a historical judgement on a period during which the
programme has evolved substantially and in which Ethiopia presented peculiar
problems and difficulties. There is certainly evidence that the quality of the
programme has improved over time.
Secondly, however, further improvement is possible, and needed if the EU is to reach
the target of an objective-driven strategy. The results of the evaluation and the
comments of the focus group discussions held in Addis Ababa coincide in the finding
that the capacity of the EU to implement an aid programme falls some way below its
capacity to agree an over-arching aid framework and establish appropriate aid
instruments. In the focus group discussions, the EU was praised for the overall quality
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of the aid framework provided by the Lomé Convention, for the range of aid
instruments at its disposal, and for providing aid in grant form. However, it was seen
to compare poorly with some other donors in policy analysis, project preparation,
delegation of authority to the field, speed and flexibility of procedures, and staffing
levels. The seven point programme in Figure 6 reflects these concerns.
Seen in this light, the question of whether EU aid is 'better' or 'worse' than bilateral
programmes is the wrong question. Some of it is undoubtedly better; some
undoubtedly worse. More accurately, the best of EU aid is certainly better than the
worst of bilateral aid; and the best of bilateral aid is certainly better than the worst of
EU aid. For example, sacrificing commercially-motivated aid like the infamous
Pergau dam in favour of a sound project like Ethiopia's Amarti river diversion would
improve overall quality; but sacrificing a good bilateral rural development project to
fund, say, more EU dairy aid, would reduce it.
Thus, the question about transferring resources from national programmes to the EU
is actually much more interesting than simply one about transferring resources willy-
nilly from one budget to another. Instead, the question needs to be framed in terms of
what will be cut on one side, and what will be increased on the other. This discussion
has yet to take place.
At the same time, both maximalists and minimalists have an interest in improving the
quality of EU aid, along the lines set out in Figure 6. Some of the changes are already
underway, as indicated above. However, the package is not complete. EU aid could be
much better (even better) than it already is. I have argued elsewhere (Maxwell 1996a)
that the underlying problems are political in nature, reflecting sins of omission and
sins of commission in the political arena. For example, the multiplicity of budget
lines, which so complicates the administration of EU aid, probably results from
attempts at ear-marking by the European parliament. Similarly, the chronic under-
staffing of the EU aid administration partly reflects expenditure limits imposed by the
member states (only partly, because many problems could be solved by appointing
more professional, local staff within existing budgets). Perhaps the current evaluation
of aid to the ACP, expected to report by early 1997, will offer a vehicle for the
resolution of these problems. Or is a political initiative is needed, like a European
Enquiry into EU aid?
Finally, does any of this help us to adjudicate between maximalists and minimalists?
On some issues, the Ethiopia study is silent. For example, it cannot be used to
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illuminate the question of whether aid to Asia, say, or the Mediterranean, would be
better framed in a Lomé-type framework. Nor did the Ethiopia study deal with trade.
On other issues, however, it is possible to extrapolate - allowing, of course, for the
particularities of the Ethiopian case.
On contractuality and partnership, the study gives comfort if anything to the
minimalists. It eloquently supports the case against the automaticity of aid, showing
how much the quality of the programme improved when automaticity began to be
eroded in Lomé III.  In the focus group discussions, recipients said they valued an
explicit and negotiated aid framework and a guaranteed flow of funds. On the first,
there is no real reason why an aid framework, setting out priorities and defining
policies, should be couched in the form of an international treaty; other donors have
frameworks without treaties.  On the other hand, this is not the same as a "negotiated"
framework, and many observers see value in the apparatus of ACP institutions that
has been created to negotiate successive Lomé agreements - even though the scope for
real negotiation has been progressively eroded.  The political case for the continuation
of Lomé institutions may be stronger than the instrumental case.  The real benefits
need to be debated, however. On the flow of funds question, a guaranteed flow
whatever the state of domestic economic policy or the human rights position of the
recipient country is clearly, and rightly these days, too much to hope for.
On finance, the Ethiopia study provides strong support for a unified budgeting system,
with one set of procedures and one mechanism for accountability. It does not
particularly favour the EDF over the budget or vice-versa, though it does note that
historically EDF proposals and reporting standards were generally higher than for
budget line items (especially food aid). This may comfort the maximalists.
On the scope of the programme, the study provides evidence that there are potential
economies of scale in bringing European aid together under a single umbrella with a
range of possible instruments, not least in the scope for policy dialogue. It was notable
that many donors, including some of the heavy-weight players in Ethiopia, were
anxious that the EU should not continue to punch below its weight, and that it should
play a better informed and more active part in policy dialogue. However, the EU's
potential has not always been fulfilled, and the study suggests that the Commission
needs both more resources and a greater focus on country-level planning if it is to be
realised. Comfort here again for the maximalists.
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On political accountability, the study is neutral, but identifies serious problems in the
sphere of reporting, both at country level, and more generally. This suggests that
improving the structures of accountability may be less important than improving the
content. Whoever controls European aid, however, the Ethiopian study also provides
strong support for less intervention from outside, whether in the form of the European
parliament insisting on new budget lines, or the Member States insisting on project
approval in a network of Development Council committees. Decentralisation and
greater autonomy of decision-making should be the watchwords of any reform of
governance of European aid.
Last but not least, administration emerges from the Ethiopia study as the Achilles heel
of European aid. If this is true for an aid programme in Ethiopia serviced largely by
one Directorate General, how much more true must it be for the multiplicity of
structures serving the totality of developing countries. A single, semi-autonomous
European Development Agency begins to look very attractive.
_____________
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